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NOTES
STATE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Devaluation of the dollar, a general decline in the price of American
corporate stock, and a shifting of monetary reserves to other parts of the
globe have increased the trend and potential of foreign investment
within the United States. Yet numerous states have legislation in force
which limits, in one form or another, domestic investment by persons
who are not United States citizens. This Note will survey current state
regulations in light of both treaty provisions between the United States
and various investing countries, and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Since a more unified policy towards foreign
investment would be in the national interest, this Note proposes that
new national treatment treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion be negotiated with critical trading partners so as to render ineffec-
tive certain onerous state regulations and facilitate international mone-
tary recycling.
I
BACKGROUND
In the early years of its economic development, the United States was
a major recipient of foreign capital and investment. Much of the capital
used to develop our raw wilderness into an industrial power came from
foreign sources. As the economic strength of the country grew, however,
the flow of capital reversed itself and America came to be considered an
exporter of capital.' The image of the United States across the world has
been cast in the form of great multinational corporations in recent years.
Yet there is now a growing trend, once again, of foreign investment
within the United States.'
1. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign
Enterprise, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1489, 1491-92 (1961). See also E. KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 211, 262, 541 (3d ed. 1951).
2. KIRKLAND, supra note 1, at 648-49. See generally, R. BARNET & R. MOLLER, GLOBAL
REACH (1974). For a solid study of the genesis of the American capital expansion, see M.
WILKINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 199-219 (1970).
Numerous individual states have mounted intensive drives to lure foreign capital inside
their borders. For instance, Georgia, Michigan, New York, South Carolina and Virginia
maintain representatives in Brussels and Tokyo. Texas has offices in Mexico, Tokyo and
London. Alabama and North Carolina have headquarters in Switzerland. Maine and
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The amount of direct foreign investment in the United States has
grown from $6.9 billion in 1960 to $21.7 billion in 1974. The total amount
of foreign holdings of stocks and bonds in the United States is much
larger. Figures released by the Treasury Department have been revised
to place the value of such holdings as of the end of 1974 at about $80 to
$85 billion.3 For the most part this phenomenon has been attributed to
investment by European citizens and the giant European companies,
the investors in America of old.4
To this recent historical trend of more foreign investment inside the
United States has been added an important new potential source of
foreign capital-"oil money."5 There is a strong possibility that the
riches accumulated by the oil nations may be invested in Western indus-
Wisconsin have offices in Frankfurt. Foreign Investment in the United States: Policy,
Problems and Obstacles, 11 THE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 33-34 (1974).
3. For figures relating to direct foreign investment, see Leftwich, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in the United States in 1973, 54 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., part 11 at 7, Table 1 (1974).
New foreign direct investments declined slightly in 1974 from their 1973 peak; the inflow
of new investments in 1974 was down to $2.26 billion from $2.66 billion in 1973, but the
reinvestment of the earnings of foreign companies' affiliates in this country brought the
total increase to $3.5 billion, making the new total of direct foreign investment $21.7
billion. Direct foreign investment figures include ownership of at least 25 percent of the
voting shares of U.S. companies or enterprises. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 29, 1975, at 4, col.
3.
When ownership of securities and other long-term financial claims is included, the
figures grow much larger, as pointed out in the text. In 1972, for example, there was $14.4
billion of foreign direct investment, but the figure swelled to $45.5 billion when these other
holdings were included. Bauer, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 11 THE
CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 23 (1974). For the 1974 figures in the text, see Wall St. Journal,
supra, at 4, col. 2.
Even though Middle East countries only record a small percentage of foreign holdings,
see N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 69, col. 1, government officials acknowledge that "banks
and brokerage concerns in Switzerland and other foreign countries may be holding large
amounts of U.S. securities for oil nations. Indeed, [a recent] Treasury study shows that
more than two-thirds of the recorded foreign holdings of U.S. corporate securities was held
by foreign banks and brokers for the account of other persons and institutions." Wall St.
Journal, supra, at 4, col. 2.
4. Wall St. Journal, June 22, 1973, at 1, col. 6. The newspaper reported that the Japa-
nese had "heretofore shown very little interest in direct U.S. investments" but now "are
also said to be exhibiting more 'interest'." This prediction was borne out in the announce-
ments of FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY AND STATE (Mar.-Nov. 1973), in which,
of a total of 133 new announcements of United States investments, 45 were made by the
Japanese. Bauer, supra note 3, at 24-25. See also Wall St. Journal, Jan. 20, 1975, at 6,
col. 2; id., Oct. 29, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
5. Hein, Oil Money and World Payments, The Billion Dollar Unsure Thing, 11 THE
CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 7 (1974). Hein estimates that of the projected 1974 revenues
to members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of $85-100
billion, at least $50 billion will have to be financed or recycled. Id. at 8. See also N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 7.
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try and real estate. Kuwait' and Iran,' for example, have indicated such
interest. Perhaps even more startling and of more concern to many
Americans was the purchase by Gaith Pharaon of Saudi Arabia of a one-
third ownership in the Bank of Commonwealth in Detroit.' At this stage,
however, most Middle East investors still seem more inclined to pur-
chase land or debt securities.'
Some commentators have viewed this two-way flow of capital as a
healthy financial development. They argue that not only does it pro-
mote economic efficiency, but that it also makes for a more truly inter-
nationalized business world with resulting higher standards of living
and a higher sense of international understanding and unity.'" In addi-
tion, many international experts in global finance and economics see
open investment in American companies, securities and real estate as a
desirable partial solution to impending monetary recycling problems."
6. Kuwait has purchased partial ownership of Daimler-Benz. Wall St. Journal, Dec. 2,
1974, at 2, col. 3; id., Dec. 3, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
7. Iran attempted to take over Pan American Airways, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, at
2, col. 5; Id., Feb. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 7, but later dropped its plans. See N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1975, at 65, col. 3.
President Ford has established an interagency committee to review investment plans
in this country by foreign governments. Although the committee has no power to approve
or disapprove such investments, it can raise objections. So far its policy has been to
welcome foreign investment in the United States. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 65, col.
3.
8. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 3. See also NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1975, at 58.
Such investment activity is not limited to oil countries. The French firm of Societe
Imetal of Paris, controlled by the Paris branch of the Rothschilds, made a $111 million
offer for the Copperweld Corporation of Pittsburgh, but the corporation has been resisting
the attempted takeover. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 65, col. 3.
9. Saudi Arabia, for example, recently placed $200 million into an account managed
by the First National City Bank, the Morgan Guaranty Bank and the Bank of America.
These monies reportedly were to be used for "more active forms of investment" in Ameri-
can company stocks. In the real estate realm, $10 million was invested in an Atlanta mall-
hotel by Kuwait, the Shah of Iran purchased 642 Fifth Avenue, in New York City, and
Kuwait purchased Kiwah Island, 15 miles north of Charleston, S.C. On an individual
level, Saudi Arabian Adnan M. Kharsoggi reportedly acquired financial institutions in
California valued at nearly $136 million. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 6. See
generally Wall St. Journal, Mar. 5, 1975, at 21, col. 2.
10. For a statement of this view which predates the arrival of Middle Eastern economic
clout and "oil money," see Hein, Foreign Investment: A Two Way Street, WORLD Bus.
PERSPECIVES No. 3 (May 1971) (unpaged publication of ThE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD).
Since the influx of "petro-dollars," there have been voices in strong support of foreign
investment in the United States. For example, diplomatic sources here have reported that
American corporations and banks have made "dozens of approaches" offering the Saudi
government private, off-the-market, stock sales and investment opportunities. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 7. See also Wall St. Journal, Feb. 7, 1975, at 6, col. 1.
11. Farmanfarmainan, Gutowski, Okita, Roose, and Wilson, How Can the WorldAfford
OPEC Oil?, 53 FoREIoN AFF. 201 (1975).
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Some politicians, on the other hand, have strongly resisted the contin-
uation of a national policy allowing free inflow of foreign capital on a
number of grounds: national defense and security, retaliation against
Arabs for their blacklist and boycott of firms doing business in Israel,
and objections based generally on "the national interest. ' 12
Although both the United States and its trading partners have re-
stricted investment by foreigners in certain areas of transportation, en-
ergy, and communication, 3 this country as a general rule has followed
a policy which strongly supports free investment among nations. 4 Such
a policy was nurtured and is partially sustained by the expansion and
maintenance of the large United States-based multinational corpora-
tions.
A number of studies have recently been made which analyze and
criticize the impact of federal regulation on foreign investment. 5 Yet
other factors act to hinder foreign investment within the United States
as well. One family of restrictions which has gone relatively unnoticed
by the commentators and national policy planners is that of state regu-
lation of foreign investment.
12. Wall St. Journal, Mar. 5, 1975, at 8, col. 2. One manifestation of this resistance
surfaced during recent congressional debate over H.R. 8951, which sought to limit acquisi-
tion by non-citizens of voting securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id., Mar. 7, 1975, at 4, col. 2. For an appraisal of this type of legislation, see Note,
U.S. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current Developments and the Congres-
sional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611 (1975).
Another bill which was recently introduced would place restrictions on foreign investors
who desire to purchase 5 percent or more of the capital stock of any American corporation
with more than $1 million of assets. S. 425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See Wall St.
Journal, Mar. 7, 1975, at 14, col. 2; Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory
Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147
(1974).
President Ford has decided to assume the role of determining whether given foreign
investments are in the national interest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1975, at 4E, col. 1, yet his
administration has generally opposed bills that move away from the "open door" policy.
Wall St. Journal, Mar. 5, 1975, at 8, col. 2.
13. See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
14. Assistant Treasury Secretary Gerald Parsky, the Administration's spokeman on
such matters, has characterized the possibility of Arab investment in the United States
as "an important opportunity" for this country and views restrictions on foreign invest-
ment as "unwarranted, potentially harmful to our national interests and in general con-
trary to our foreign investment policy." NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1975, at 62-63. For examples
of the policy of the Ford administration, see notes 7 and 12 supra.
15. See, e.g., Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater
Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments?, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 551 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Rising Tide]; Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory Controls
in Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, supra note 12; Note, U. S. Regulation
of Foreign Direct Investment: Current Developments and the Congressional Response,
supra note 12.
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II
SURVEY OF STATE LAW
State regulations which act to restrict foreign investment exist in
great numbers. While there are some state regulations which restrict
investment in personalty, much of the standing legislation is aimed at
curbing foreign investment in real property.'" The regulations as they
exist are diverse and at times contradictory to the major campaigns
which many states mount in order to attract foreign investment.'7 The
attempts by states to regulate foreign investment can be classified into
types: (1) blanket restrictions against alien investment; (2) varying
forms which embody a combination of restrictions; (3) restrictions based
on residential status; (4) restrictions based on eligibility for citizenship;
(5) restrictions against enemy aliens; (6) the complete absence of restric-
tions. In order to create an understanding of the extent and diversity of
such regulation, a survey and classification of state regulations follows.
A. CLASSIFICATION OF STATE STATUTES
1. Blanket Restrictions Against Aliens
There are a few states which put a general blanket restriction upon
alien investment in real estate, without distinguishing whether or not
the alien is a resident. A Nebraska statute, for example, states in part
that "[a]liens . . . are prohibited from acquiring title or taking or
holding any land, or real estate, or any leasehold interest extending for
a period for more than five years . . . by descent, devise, purchase or
otherwise. . . -"I This type of regulation could prove a real hindrance
to foreign corporations wishing to open a manufacturing plant in the
United States. Their executives could not purchase or lease land for the
plant for more than five years-an impractical commercial situation.
2. Varying Forms of Restrictions
Some states provide disabilities in more complex forms, ranging from
16. Both types of restrictions have substantial commercial effect: the former precludes
foreign ownership of stocks, bonds and notes, while the latter bars not only foreign invest-
ment in real estate per se but also the establishment of foreign owned plants and factories
in the United States where purchase of the plant real estate may be desirable.
17. See note 2 supra.
18. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-402 (1971). The statute also applies to corporations not incor-
porated under the laws of the state. South Carolina, another state in this category, has a
strange statute which provides that "[n]o alien or corporation controlled by aliens, either
in his or its own right or as trustee, cestui que trust or agent, shall own or control within
the limits of this State more than five hundred thousand acres of land." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 57-103 (1962).
[Vol. 9:82
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limitations on the manner in which aliens can obtain the land to the
manner in which land may be utilized. Even within individual states,
these restrictions generate internal confusion as to the policy behind
them. For instance, Idaho appears to present an open policy by allowing
"[a]ny person, whether citizen or alien, [to] take, hold and dispose
of property, real or personal,"' 9 yet at the same time providing that all
sales of state lands shall be made to citizens of the United States and
to those who shall have declared their intention to become citizens."0
Indiana has an even more bifurcated approach to alien land ownership,
stating in one statute that aliens may hold and enjoy real estate in the
same manner as the state's citizens2' but providing in another that only
resident aliens who have declared an intention to establish American
citizenship may acquire and hold real estate.22
A few states in this category allow aliens to invest and own land in
the state only on the condition that United States citizens, through
treaties or otherwise, be given reciprocal treatment in the alien's home
country. For instance, Wyoming restricts alien property rights as a gen-
eral rule, using the residency and eligibility for citizenship technique,
but provides an exception for those aliens falling within a reciprocity
clause.? Kansas provides, in establishing rights as to the transmission
or inheritance of real estate, that all aliens not eligible to citizenship
shall be able to hold land according to the extent described by treaty
between the United States and the nation of which the alien is a citizen
or subject.214
19. IDAHO CODE § 55-103 (1947). For similar statutes, see ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-1 to 6-6
(Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381-290 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.22
(Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 22, 24-25, 28, 53-60 (1965). Oregon limits the
purchase of land in the state to citizens or those who have declared their intention to
become citizens. ORE. REV. STAT. § 273.255 (1974). Hawaii requires that only citizens of
the United States be allowed to participate in disposition of lands in the Oahu Land
Development. HAWAn REv. STAT. § 206-19 (Supp. 1974). See also id. § 516-33 (Supp. 1974).
20. IDAHO CODE § 58-313 (Supp. 1974).
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-1-8-1 (1973).
22. Id. § 32-1-7-1 (1973). The only reconciliation available is the compiler's suggestion
that the latter section "would seem to be largely superceded" by the former.
23. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-151 (Supp. 1975).
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1964). Although reciprocity provisions as to investment
have not been tested by the courts, similar provisions in a probate context making the
right of nonresident aliens to acquire personal property dependent upon reciprocal rights
of American citizens in the aliens' home countries have been held by the Supreme Court
not to be state infringement of the foreign affairs domain of the federal government. Clark
v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1946). However, the Court has held invalid on this ground
an Oregon escheat statute which, in addition to reciprocity, required an evaluation of the
right of foreign heirs to receive the proceeds. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1967). A
District Court, however, has construed a Montana reciprocity clause in light of Clark and
Zschernig and determined that reciprocity statutes are not per se unconstitutional. It
1975]
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3. Restrictions Based on Residential Status
Another category of restrictions centers on the residential status of the
alien; that is, whether or not he is a resident of the United States."3
Wisconsin uses this -classification to limit land ownership by aliens,
corporations not created under the laws of a state of the United States,
and corporations or associations of which 20 percent of the stock "is or
may be owned" by a nonresident alien."8 Connecticut bases its restric-
tions on this same theory but words an exception in positive terms for
the country of France." Connecticut's statutes then branch into other
directions, allowing nonresident aliens to hold property for the purposes
of "quarrying, mining, dressing or smelting ores on the same or convert-
ing the products of such quarries and mines into articles of trade and
commerce." If the alien allows such land to be unused for the purposes
enumerated, then he will forfeit the land.2
4. Restrictions Based on Eligibility for Citizenship
The eligibility of aliens to become citizens of the United States forms
the basis of barriers to alien land ownership in this group of states. This
particular type of restriction arose because of discriminatory sentiment
against Asian aliens and manifested itself in the Alien Land Laws begin-
ning in 1921.2 California was the first state to enact such measures" and
the states which followed this approach-Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana,
Montana and New Mexico-still maintain restrictions based on ineligi-
decided that if the state courts only read the law of a foreign country to determine whether
reciprocity exists, then reciprocity does not infringe upon the prerogatives of the federal
government. Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968). See also Comment, Iron
Curtain Statutes - What Is The Standard of Constitutionality?, 9 DUQUESNE U.L. REV.
242 (1970-71).
25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1501 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-1, 64-3 (1975). Missis-
sippi's Constitution provides that "[tihe legislature shall enact laws to limit, restrict, or
prevent the acquiring and holding of land in this state by non-resident aliens, and may
limit or restrict the acquiring or holding of lands by corporations." MIss. CONST., art. 4, §
84 (1890). See also NEv. Rxv. STAT. §§ 134.230, 134.250 (1973).
26. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (1974).
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 (Supp. 1975). Quaere as to the impact of this
provision on nations which have unconditional "most favored nation" treaties with the
United States.
28. Id. § 47-58 (1960). This approach, which allows nonresident aliens the right to mine,
quarry and smelt ores, is in direct contrast with an Alaska statute which allows only an
alien protected by a reciprocal treaty or who has declared his intention to become a United
States citizen to acquire mining or exploration rights. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190(a)(3)-(4)
(1974).
29. R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 106, at 396-97 (complete ed. 1973).
30. Id.
[Vol. 9:82
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bility for citizenship.' New Mexico, a prime example, originally based
its restrictions on alien land ownership solely on residency. 2 In 1921,
however, New Mexico amended its Constitution to forbid aliens "ineligi-
ble to citizenship under the laws of the United States" and corporations,
copartnerships and associations, a majority of which are owned by al-
iens, from acquiring title or leasehold interests in New Mexico real
estate.33 Kansas also maintains restrictions on this theory but states
them in positive terms, granting aliens "eligible for citizenship" the
same rights of real estate ownership possessed by citizens. Then it
establishes rights of "all other aliens" under a reciprocity clause.3 1 Al-
though the racially based rationale for this type of restriction is now
passe, its products, these existing restrictions, continue to survive.
5. Restrictions Against Alien Enemies
Some states have removed all restrictions against investments by
"alien friends" and have left standing or have imposed restrictions
against "alien enemies." Virginia's Code, for example, provides that
"[any alien, not an enemy, may acquire by purchase or descent and
hold real estate in this State. . .. -3" Georgia uses a variation of the
same principle and requires the alien's government to be "at peace"
with the United States before he can purchase, hold, and convey real
estate .3 The difference between the two could prove significant in this
age of conflict without declaration of war. For more important reasons,
however, the entire category should be abolished. It is the role of the
federal government, and not the states, to engage in policies of war and
peace. Furthermore, this category has importance only when the United
States is at war. Accordingly, any restrictions based upon these catego-
ries should be left to the discretion of the federal policy-making appara-
tus.
In whatever form presented by the several states, these regulations act
31. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1201 (1974); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-103, 58-313 (1948); LA.
CONST. art. 19, § 21; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-520 (Supp. 1974); N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 22.
32. The New Mexico Constitution contained a clause which prohibited distinctions
"between resident aliens and citizens" regarding the ownership or descent of property.
Comment to N.M. CONST. art. H, § 22.
33. N.M. CONST. art II, § 22.
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1964).
35. Id. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1 (1974).
37. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 79-303, 79-304 (1973). While Alaska has an alien enemy exclusion
clause, it also has restrictions against the percentage of alien stockholder ownership in
corporations which might acquire exploration and mining rights in the state. ALASKA STAT.
§ 38.05.190(a)(6) (1974).
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to discourage foreign investment. At the very outset, the statutes per se
erect some restrictions, whether they forbid nonresident aliens from
investing, base their restrictions on eligibility for citizenship, or whether
the restrictions are based on a combination of theories. Furthermore, in
broader perspective, the mere existence of such regulations by so many
states automatically acts to chill open and free investment. The burden
is placed squarely on the foreign investor, forcing him to scrutinize state
laws to see where and how he can invest. The burden is even greater if
the investor finds a good investment opportunity that is forbidden by a
state having regulations which violate treaty and constitutional protec-
tions. This situation acts as a severe deterrent to investment in that it
places the burden of court contest and legal challenge on the would-be
investor. An example of how such state regulations can act to hinder
foreign investment comes clear in a recent tender offer by a Canadian
company for a Texas corporation.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corporation (C.D.C.)
case 38 arose when C.D.C. attempted acquisition of Texasgulf through a
tender offer. One of the defenses Texasgulf attempted to use in seeking
a permanent injunction restraining C.D.C. from proceeding with and
consummating the tender offer of stock purchase was that the attempt
violated Article 1527, Texas Revised Civil Statutes." Article 1527 re-
quired that the majority of the stock of international trading corpora-
tions be owned by citizens of the United States and furthermore that
control of these corporations must be vested only in citizens of the
United States and of the state of Texas. The District Court determined
that Texasgulf was not an international trading corporation and, there-
fore, that Article 1527 did not apply.
While the court's decision turned on narrow, definitional grounds, a
far deeper policy decision seems to have been the true rationale. The
court noted that "[i]f Texasgulf's argument prevailed, there would be
38. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
39. Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1527 (1962) provides in part:
A majority of the stock [of international trading corporations] shall in all
instances be owned by citizens of the United States, and a majority of the officers
and directors thereof shall in all instances be citizens of the United States and of
this State. Nothing in this article shall prevent citizens of foreign countries from
becoming stockholders in such corporations, but the control of such corporations
shall never in any instance be vested in citizens of other countries than the United
States. Violation of any provision herein as to the control of stock of such corpora-
tion shall be sufficient for the Secretary of State to cancel the charter of said
corporation and same shall be placed in the hands of a receiver as provided by
law.
[Vol. 9:82
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a flight of Texas corporations to Delaware and other states, especially
those Texas subsidiaries of many foreign-owned companies," seem-
ingly implying that, although the state has restrictions, they are not in
the interest of the state and therefore should be construed most nar-
rowly.
In so holding, the court enumerated C.D.C.'s arguments for the con-
tention that Article 1527 could not serve as the basis for a preliminary
injunction, and wrote that "[t]hey are recited here merely to illustrate
the serious hurdles which would have to be cleared before Article 1527
could pose a real threat." The contentions, inter alia, were that (1) the
control provision of Article 1527 was unconstitutional because it was in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment rights of aliens, and (2) that
it conflicted with United States treaty provisions.' The litigation in the
Texasgulf case which resulted from attempted state regulation of foreign
investment demonstrates that such legislation, where it exists, can pose
real problems to the foreign or alien investor.
THE TREATY BARRIER
According to the United States Constitution:
[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
Any state statute, and particularly a statute which limits the freedom
of aliens, can only be valid insofar as it remains consistent with United
States treaties. Just as the types of state restrictions on foreign invest-
ment are numerous, so are the types of treaty relationships the United
States maintains with its partners regarding trade, commerce and in-
vestment. Varying answers about the extent of investment permitted
citizens of a nation result from the operation of these diverse treaties.
Accordingly, each type of treaty must be considered individually to
determine its particular effect on a given nation's citizens' freedom to
invest in the United States. This outcome is complicated further still
when the impact of state regulation is considered in the total analysis.
It is, therefore, appropriate that a general survey of existing treaty regu-
lations be made.
40. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corporation, 366 F. Supp. 374, 416 n.61
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
41. Id. at 415.
42. U.S. CONST., art. VI.
1975]
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A. SURVEY OF TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION
1. National Treatment Treaties
In recent years the United States has extended "national treatment"
to a number of its investment partners through treaties of friendship,
commerce and navigation (F.C.N.).11 This genre of treaty contains the
most liberal provisions this country affords a foreign nation. "National
treatment" as used in these F.C.N. treaties means that a contracting
party must be treated no less favorably "than the treatment accorded
therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or
other objects, as the case may be . . ." of the other contracting party."
A clause in one of our treaties with Luxembourg, for instance, provides
for "national treatment" with respect to business activities within the
territory of the other country, and specifically permits nationals and
companies of the other party to establish branch agencies and factories,
to organize corporations within the other nation's territory, and to "con-
trol or manage enterprises which they have established or acquired" in
the other country. 5 Such a treaty in effect affords citizens of the party
nation the same rights a citizen of Texas would have if he were to
attempt to invest in California. There is almost no limit to the type of
commercial activity they can engage in: they can organize or create new
industry or an industrial plant, and can purchase or hold real estate as
easily as any American citizen, regardless of state statutory language to
the contrary. There is no numerical limitation as to percentage of con-
trol or absolute acreage to limit their holding. The investment freedom
is almost complete.
43. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, May 29, 1966, art. IV,
paras. 1 and 5, [1968] 5 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations with Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, art. V, para. 1, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193;
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, art.
VI, para. 1, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Convention of Establishment with
France, Nov. 25, 1959, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Treaty of Amity, Eco-
nomic Relations and Consular Rights with Muscat and Oman, December 20, 1958, art.
V. para. 1, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation with the Republic of Korea, Nov. 28, 1956, art. VII, para. 1, [1957] 2 U.S.T.
2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with The Neth-
erlands, March 27, 1956, art. VII, para. 1 [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29,
1954, art. VII, para. 1, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Japan, April 2, 1953, art. VII, para. 1, [1953] 2 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Aug.
23, 1951, art. VII, para. 1, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948. See Note, The Rising
Tide 568.
44. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23,
1962, art. XV para. 1, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306.
45. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
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2. Most Favored Nation Treaties
A second type of treaty grants to the contracting parties "most fa-
vored nation" status in specific commercial areas such as investment
status, organization of companies, holding of executive position, and
acquisition of shares.46 For instance, under the United States' most fa-
vored nation treaty with Belgium,47 if Belgium were to grant to Egypt a
reduction in the import tariff on cotton, then this special rate would also
46. "A most-favored-nation clause between two states merely stipulates that each state
will grant the other commercial rights equal to the most favorable rights granted to any
state." H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (rev. ed. 1968). For a contrast between "na-
tional treatment" and "most favored nation" treaties, see L. McNAiR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 273 (1961).
47. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium, Feb. 21, 1961,
art. VI, paras. 1-2, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432. Other treaties of this genre
are as follows: Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, art. VII,
[1961] 1 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with Denmark,Oct. 1, 1951, art. VIII, para. 1, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797;
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights with Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, art.
V, [1957] 1 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with
Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 1951, art. IX, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. VI, para. 2 [1950]
1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. I1, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with China (Republic of China), Nov. 4, 1946, art. IV, 63 Stat.
1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. XVHI, 54 Stat. 1739 (1941), T.S. No. 956; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights with Finland, Feb. 13, 1934, art. XVII, 49 Stat. 2659
(1936), T.S. No. 868; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Austria, June
19, 1928, art. X, 47 Stat. 1876 (1933), T.S. No. 838; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consular Rights with Norway, June 5, 1928, art. XIII, 47 Stat. 2135 (1933), T.S. No. 852;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Latvia, April 20, 1928, art.
XIV, 45 Stat. 2641 (1929), T.S. No. 765 [by a note to the Secretary of State dated July
11, 1951, the Charge d'Affaires of Latvia in Washington acquiesced in the application of
controls to trade between the United States and Latvia while Latvia is under Soviet
influence; see U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 151 (1973)]; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights with Honduras, Dec. 7, 1927, art. XV, 45 Stat. 2618
(1929), T.S. No. 764; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Estonia,
Dec. 23, 1925, art. XIII, 44 Stat. 2379 (1926), T.S. No. 736 [by a note to the Secretary of
State dated July 16, 1951, the Acting Consul General of Estonia in Charge of the Estonian
Legation in New York acquiesced in the application of controls to trade between the
United States and Estonia while Estonia is under Soviet domination or control. U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, supra, at 75]; Treaty of Commercial Relations with Serbia (Yugoslavia), Oct.
2 and 14, 1881, art. 11, 22 Stat. 963 (1883), T.S. No. 319; Treaty of Friendship, Reciprocal
Establishments, Commerce and Surrender of Fugitive Criminals with Switzerland, Nov.
25, 1859, art. I, 11 Stat. 587 (1859), T.S. No. 353. See Note, The Rising Tide 568, 573,
575-76.
For a comparison of investment protection provisions of two of these treaties, see Treaty
with Liberia, text accompanying note 56 infra, and Treaty with Italy, infra note 57.
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apply to cotton coming from the United States." Historically, the
United States only granted conditional most favored nation treaties, but
in 1922 the United States began to grant unconditional most favored
nation commerce treaties whereby "most favored nation treatment was
not to be conditioned upon meeting special concessions."4 Presently
some seventeen treaties between the United States and other countries
fit this general category.
3. Earlier Treaties
The remainder of the F.C.N. treaties which are in force were negoti-
ated during a period of American history in which there was little con-
cern with regulation of investment activities between the contracting
parties. However, these treaties are still in force and thus still may
present barriers to state regulation. 0 An example of such a treaty, pro-
viding only very limited rights to the parties, is a treaty with Yemen
which provides that within the other country, nationals of each party
shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the coun-
try, and shall not be treated in any manner less favorable than the
nationals of any third country.5'
This type of provision covers only personal rights of the citizens and does
not touch upon commerce; apparently no provisions respecting invest-
ment were even contemplated. Such treaties, with their total lack of
commercial and investment provisions, do not fit the present commer-
cial world but reflect the times in which they arose: the mid-19th and
early 20th centuries. Some of the nations involved, of course, may have
little interchange with the United States, but in light of trading econom-
ics, at the least, these treaties should be individually examined.
48. McNAIR, supra note 46, at 273-305. Under conditional "most favored nation" treat-
ies, contracting parties do not automatically receive favors bestowed upon others, but
must promise reciprocal treatment in order to receive the benefit.
49. JACOBINI, supra note 46, at 153.
50. Agreement Respecting Friendship and Commerce with Yemen, May 4, 1946, art.
I1, 60 Stat. 1782 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1535; Treaty of Friendship and General Relations
with Spain, July 3, 1902, art. II, 33 Stat. 2105 (1905), T.S. No. 422; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859, art. 11, 12 Stat. 1091 (1863), T.S.
No. 272; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Argentina, July 27, 1853,
art. III, 10 Stat. 1005 (1855), T.S. No. 4; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with Costa Rica, July 10, 1851, art. III, 10 Stat. 916 (1855), T.S. No. 62; Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Bruni, June 23, 1850, art. II, 10 Stat. 909
(1855), T.S. No. 33; Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce with Colombia,
Dec. 12, 1846, art. H1, 9 Stat. 881 (1851), T.S. No. 54. See also Note, The Rising Tide 576
n.96.
51. Agreement Respecting Friendship and Commerce with Yemen, May 4, 1946, art.
111, 60 Stat. 1782 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1535.
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B. IMPACT OF TREATIES ON STATE REGULATION
In general, as to those nations with whom the United States has
existing treaties granting national treatment in matters of commerce
and industry, state discriminatory regulations against aliens must fall
since treaties which grant aliens rights equal to those enjoyed by Ameri-
can citizens are the supreme law of the land.52 This outcome seems clear
regardless of whether the theory of restriction is based on enemy alien-
age, residential status or eligibility for citizenship. Should a given state
decide to impose investment restrictions on citizens and corporations of
both foreign nations and sister states, however, the discrimination
against all investors would be mutual and, in the absence of a discrimi-
nation between aliens and persons from other states, would not be a
violation of these treaties.53 However, no state is likely to exclude invest-
ment by citizens of its sister states, and therefore state restrictions on
alien investment are likely to remain unconstitutional. Moreover, in-
vestment in certain areas is covered by special federal legislation,54 and
the doctrine of federal preemption will invalidate state regulations in
those areas.
Treaties in the second category, those containing "most favored na-
tion" clauses as to commerce and investment, must be studied on an
individual basis in order to determine whether they protect the contract-
ing party from investment regulations by the states." For example, the
"most favored nation" treaty with Liberia seems expressly to leave lati-
tude for state regulation since an article in that treaty specifies that the
right of one country's corporations to exercise their functions in the
other country is governed "by the laws and regulations, National, State
52. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. One state court long ago held that where
an alien is disqualified under state law from taking, holding, or transferring real property,
the disqualification is removed if a treaty with the alien's country confers such rights.
Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N.E. 195 (1893), error dismissed without opinion,
154 U.S. 524 (1893). See also Annot., 92 L.Ed. 285 (1947).
53. See Walker, Modem Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 805, 818-19 (1958); Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of
Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. COMP. L. 229, 233 (1956).
One author has noted that individual states are "free to discriminate against out-of-state
investors as long as they do not distinguish between out-of-state U.S. investors and treaty
alien investors." Note, The Rising Tide 569. Under this analysis, that portion of the
regulation of directors imposed by Article 1527 of the Texas statutes, note 39 supra, could
stand because it merely required that "a majority of the officers and directors thereof shall
in all instances be citizens of the United States and of this State." Id. (emphasis added).
54. These areas include the development of water power sites on navigable streams, 16
U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970), fresh water shipping, 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970), production of atomic
energy, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1970), mining on federal lands, communications, 47 U.S.C.
§ 319 (1970), and air transport, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1508 (1970).
55. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
19751
Cornell International Law Journal
or Provincial, which are in force or may hereafter be established within
the territories of the Party. . . ."I' On the other hand, the treaty with
Italy is clearly akin to the national treatment treaties in its provision
that nationals, corporations and association of each party may enjoy in
the other country the rights of promotion, incorporation, purchase, own-
ership and sale of shares.1
7
The third classification of treaties, those concluded during our earlier
years, does not seem to have guaranteed freedom of investment between
the contracting parties. s In the absence of such a guarantee, attempts
by individual states to regulate foreign investment would be enforceable
and valid both under the treaty and under federal law. 9
Once the determination has been made that a given state regulation
may stand because there is no overriding treaty obligation, a second
major barrier must be crossed: whether or not state regulation of alien
investments is a denial of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution."
IV
THE EQUAL PROTECTION BARRIER
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
Although in the frontier days of America's development, resident al-
iens possessed many of the rights and privileges that citizens enjoyed,
attitudes toward the alien began to change as the country industrialized
and urbanized. 1 In 1889 the Supreme Court first used the equal protec-
56. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art.
XVIII, 54 Stat. 1739 (1941), T.S. No. 956.
57. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. III,
para. 2, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965 provides in part that "corporations and
associations of either High Contracting Party. . . created or organized under the applica-
ble laws and regulations within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, shall
be permitted to engage in the aforementioned activities. . . upon terms no less favorable
than those now or hereafter accorded to corporations and associations of such other High
Contracting Party controlled by its own nationals, corporations and associations."
58. Treaties falling within this category are listed in note 50 supra.
59. See note 53 supra.
60. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. Note, Equal Protection Review of State Statutes Restricting Alien Employment, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 92 (1974); Comment, Equal Protection and Supremacy Clause Limita-
tions on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 136; Note, 5 VAND. J.
TRA SNAT'L L. 535 (1972). For an historical summary of discrimination resulting from the
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tion clause on behalf of aliens and in the landmark case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins62 struck down state legislation restricting resident aliens in the
area of employment. In a subsequent case, Truax v. Raich,63 however,
the Court, while striking down a discriminatory statute, nonetheless
observed that:
The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation
or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or re-
sources of the people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited
to citizens as against both aliens and the citizens of other states."
Thus, some powers for state discriminatory regulations against aliens
continued to exist until the Court's 1948 decision in Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Commission,5 which announced that "the power of a state to
apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits." 6 In 1971 the case of Graham v. Richardson67
advanced even further the broad protection of resident aliens and de-
clared that aliens were a discrete and insular minority, and thus any
"classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."68
This protective rationale seems to be founded in sound policy considera-
tions. Aliens in the United States are bound to give allegiance to the
United States while in its boundaries,69 must pay income taxes7" and are
subject to the laws of the United States.' Yet the protection offered
aliens in Graham applies only to those aliens within the territorial
arrivals of large numbers of Orientals in California, see Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring
opinion in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-73 (1947).
62. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
63. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
64. Id. at 39-40. For the rationale behind this holding, see the opinion by Justice Car-
dozo, then sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154,
161, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 429-30 (1915).
65. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
66. Id. at 420. In Takahashi the Court invalidated a California statute prohibiting
aliens from making a living by fishing in waters off its shores.
67. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
68. Id. at 372. Graham held that a state could not constitutionally deny welfare benefits
to aliens for reasons of noncitizenship. One commentator observed that "[t]he clear
impact of Graham is that any state classification based on alienage is not only inherently
suspect and must meet a compelling interest standard for its justification but is also
probably beyond the state's legislative jurisdiction." Note, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 393,
395 (1972).
69. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See also Comment,
Constitutional Protection of Aliens, 40 TENN. L. Ray. 235, 243 (1973).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1 (1956).
71. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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boundaries of the United States; the non-resident alien does not benefit
from the constitutional protection.1 2
B. STATE LAWS IN LIGHT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Resident alien investors who find themselves statutorily barred from
certain investment activities may wish to attack the state regulations
by means of the equal protection clause. The wording of the statute,
under equal protection analysis, may have a considerable impact on the
success of such an attempt.
For instance, if an alien were stymied by the statutes of Nebraska or
South Carolina," where the provision simply regulates against "aliens,"
the statute would probably be invalidated under the equal protection
clause since the use of the term "alien" would discriminate against a
category protected by the Graham doctrine, 4 e.g., the resident alien.
Similarly, statutes like the Texas statute which speak in terms of "citi-
zens of the United States" 5 are also subject to attack because they too
discriminate against a class of protected individuals. In such circum-
stances, a state must show a compelling state interest before it can
perpetrate discriminatory regulations7e-a heavy burden to meet.
State statutes discriminating against alien enemies" would also be
subject to equal protection challenge since even in time of national
conflict resident aliens are protected by the Constitution. The state
could argue that it has a "compelling interest" in such a circumstance,
but regulation in this area seems more properly to belong to the control
of the federal government in the determination of its foreign policy
course, coincidentally preempting state regulation through the Suprem-
acy Clause. 8
State regulations which expressly rest on grounds of non-residential
status" avoid the constitutional pitfalls.
72. The Court recently stated that "[this protection extends, specifically, ... to
aliens who 'work for a living in the common occupations of the community,'" citing
Justice Holmes in Truax v. Raich, 293 U.S. 33, 44 (1915). Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 641 (1973). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
73. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 39 supra..
76. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 passim. See Comment, Constitutional Protec-
tion of Aliens, supra note 69, at 240-44. For a discussion of the requirements of a compel-
ling state interest immediately prior to Graham see Note, Protection of Alien Rights
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1970 DUKE L.J. 583. For an example of the application
of Graham and Sugarman in the area of compelling interest, see Jagnandan v. Giles, 379
F. Supp. 1178, 1184-86 (N.D.Miss. 1974).
77. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
79. See notes 25-28 and 53 supra and accompanying text.
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V
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
If a state statute does not contravene a standing treaty and if the
particular restriction presented by that statute does not violate the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, then it may
remain as an effective restriction to investment. In any event, among
the fifty states there is a wide range of possible outcomes. By the very
existence of such diversity, a coherent, defined policy towards interna-
tional investment is impossible. There seems to be little wisdom in
presenting the international financial community with this morass of
varied but valid state regulations. The magnitude of the diplomatic and
economic problem is such that a unified, liberal economic policy ap-
pears in the national interest." At the very least, some mechanism
should be developed or utilized to allow United States policy makers
more flexibility in exercise of the national interest.
Outright preemption of states' rights in this area by Congress would
pose political problems, yet the need for national control of investment
policy presented extends to only a fairly narrow group of countries, e.g.,
those countries which have no protective treaty agreements and yet
provide much of the recent inflow of foreign investments. It is primarily
the OPEC countries which fall into this classification."
Given the limited yet vastly important nature of the problem, it is not
unrealistic to suggest that the United States begin negotiations for new,
more appropriate F.C.N. treaties with critical oil exporting nations.
Where appropriate, national treatment provisions should be included."
These treaty provisions should preclude state regulations at the most
vital points and substitute for diversity a unified policy in the national
interest. In this manner, onerous state regulations could be circum-
80. See Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory Controls on Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States, supra note 12, at 154-55, 181-87.
81. See note 5 supra. There are eleven OPEC countries of which five, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Libya, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, have 65 percent of proven reserves and provide 48
percent of the current output. At the same time, these nations have a population of only
12 million people and there are very limited possibilities of absorbing all this incoming
capital on internal economic development. Furthermore, although these reserves have a
potential of lasting at least 50 years, there are few other national resources in these
countries. Chenery, Restructuring the World Economy, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 242, 249-53
(1975). Of these five, the United States does not maintain F.C.N. treaties with Kuwait,
Libya, Qatar or Abu Dhabi. In addition, the treaty with Saudi Arabia was signed in 1933
and contains no provisions for investment. Provisional Agreement Between the United
States of America And The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia In Regard To Diplomatic And
Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Commerce And Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933,
142 L.N.T.S. 329.
82. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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vented and the executive branch would be free to negotiate, on optimal
terms, agreements allowing investment access to American markets.
CONCLUSION
A wide variety of statutes are currently in force in a number of the
states which restrict, in one form or another, investment in the United
States by noncitizens. Such legislation may well fail constitutional stan-
dards since it may contravene treaties, which are the supreme law of the
land, or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
Regardless of whether these statutes are constitutionally valid, they do
present a complex web of differing restrictions which will inevitably
puzzle, and in some cases may deter, the foreign investor looking for
investment opportunities in this country. Since the national economic
interest would be furthered if this maze of regulations could be circum-
vented, this author proposes that the United States begin to negotiate
new treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with certain key
investing nations, providing treaty protection from investment restric-
tions erected by the several states. In so doing, a national policy of unity
in investment control would prevail over the present array of uncohesive
diversity.
Louie Burton Barnes, III
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